The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has approved an update to the country’s nuclear doctrine that expands the list of conditions under which Russia may launch a nuclear strike. The new policy states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression by a state, even if this country does not possess nuclear weapons of its own. If the aggressor is backed by a nuclear power, this is deemed to be sufficient. In such cases, even a conventional attack on Russia would be considered a joint attack, and could trigger a nuclear response.
The text does not contain specific references to particular states, but in the context of the current war, there are clear parallels with Ukraine — a country that does not possess nuclear weapons — and its NATO allies, including the United States and France, which are nuclear powers.
Old wording takes on a new meaning
Speaking to DW, Pavel Podvig, an independent analyst and expert on Russian nuclear forces, pointed out that the formulation has been in place since 1995. However, he says, at that time the assumption was that the scenario would play out in reverse: “A nuclear power was seen as the potential source of aggression — almost certainly in reference to a NATO state — and its non-nuclear ally would be punished as well.”
According to the new doctrine, aggression against Russia or its allies by a state that is part of a military alliance, such as NATO, will also be regarded as aggression by the whole coalition.
More ‘military threats’
In addition, the revised doctrine says the Kremlin may also consider using nuclear weapons if it has “reliable information about the massive deployment of air and space resources” crossing into Russian territory. This includes planes, missiles, and drones.
The new document thus expands the list of so-called military threats that would justify the use of a nuclear deterrent. These now include the possession of all types of weapons of mass destruction that could be used against Russia, as well as military exercises close to its borders.
Furthermore, the doctrine states that Russian nuclear weapons may be used if there is a “critical threat to the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and conventional weapons.” It does not clarify what should be considered a “critical threat.”
‘Critical’ is the decisive word
Pavel Podvig notes that the previous version referred only to “the existence of the state itself” being under threat. As to whether the occupation of parts of Russia’s Kursk region by the Ukrainian army or US missile strikes on Russian airfields would be considered a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity, Podvig focuses on the new doctrine’s use of the word “critical.”
It is not clear, he says, what sort of threat would be regarded as critical, and what would not. He comments that such things are intentionally left undefined: There is always room for interpretation in documents like this. “As I always say,” Podvig remarks ironically, “they’re not going to argue this in court: No one’s going to hold a hearing before carrying out a nuclear strike.”
Nonetheless, he believes there is a certain sense in formulating it like this. “How, for example, might the theoretical loss of the annexed Ukrainian territories be perceived? Russia can of course claim that this represents a critical threat to its territorial integrity, but no one else in the world recognizes these territories as part of the Russian Federation.” It would therefore be difficult, Podvig says, to argue that this constituted a critical threat to its sovereignty.
Are we on the brink of nuclear war?
However, in his view, the new doctrine certainly does not mean Russia is already gearing up for nuclear war. Podvig also believes it highly unlikely that Russia will deploy nuclear weapons against Ukraine. “From a military point of view, it would make no sense, because it wouldn’t change the situation on the frontline. You must understand that all other countries would react extremely negatively to any such deployment.”
The document only reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in this or that situation, Podvig says. “It doesn’t say anywhere that ‘we will use them’ or we ‘are obliged to use them.’ Everything is left to the discretion of whoever deploys them.” Podvig describes this as a declarative document for the outside world, with the aim of explaining to all potential adversaries how Russia sees the role of nuclear weapons in guaranteeing its own security.
Message to the West
These potential adversaries also include Western politicians — the ones to whom the new Russian nuclear doctrine is primarily addressed. Commentaries in the Russian press confirm this. For example, pravda.ru writes that, while the doctrine does not contain any radical new provisions, it is significant in that it sends an important signal to other states.
“Countries that are prepared to enter into a conflict with Russia risk a nuclear response. This doctrine is primarily a message to the team of the outgoing US president,” summarizes the Russian political scientist Nikolai Kostikin.
Asked whether there was a connection between the updating of the doctrine and the US’s decision to authorize the use of US missiles by the Ukrainian army on Russian territory, Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov avoided answering. The updated doctrine was published “at the appropriate time,” he said, adding that instructions had been given by the president well before this for a new version to be prepared.
This article has been translated from German.
