China is reportedly considering sending security personnel into conflict-ridden Myanmar to protect its economic and strategic interests, a move that could either escalate the ongoing civil war or shift the balance in favor of the military junta, which has ruled parts of the country since its coup in early 2021.
In recent months, Beijing has ramped up economic and diplomatic support for the military regime, following years of balancing between the junta and a loose alliance of pro-democracy forces and ethnic-based militias.
China, which shares a 2,100-kilometer border with Myanmar, initially adopted a cautious stance after the 2021 coup that sparked a nationwide revolt. Beijing had previously maintained good relations with the ousted civilian government led by Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.
However, as the civil war deepened, Beijing’s priorities shifted toward securing its investments and infrastructure projects in the region, which have been severely disrupted.
According to Moe Thuzar, a senior fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, China’s growing involvement is driven by a desire to safeguard its strategic interests, particularly its investment portfolio in Myanmar, which totals approximately €21 billion.
This includes constructing a port on Myanmar’s Indian Ocean coastline, providing Beijing with a crucial route to import oil and gas from the Middle East, bypassing the contentious South China Sea.
What is China’s level of support?
According to a report from November 15 published in The Irrawaddy newspaper, China and Mynamar’s junta are preparing to cooperate on forming a “joint security company.”
Analysts believe Chinese personnel would primarily focus on defending Chinese-owned businesses and infrastructure, which have increasingly become targets of violence. The Chinese consulate in Mandalay was bombed in October.
However, Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington, warned that even a defensive deployment could have broader implications.
“For junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, it is an utter humiliation and a tacit admission that his forces are spread so thin, across so many distinct battlefields, that he has no choice but to use Chinese mercenaries,” Abuza told DW.
Chinese security teams may provide intelligence and logistical support to the junta—or even engage in offensive operations, he warned.
What can the US and Europe do to respond?
With China now apparently providing the junta with greater support, there are concerns Myanmar will become more of a proxy arena for the US-China rivalry.
Lucas Myers, a senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, wrote this month in War On The Rocks that Beijing’s decision to back the junta over fears that the anti-military coalition is too close to the US is a reflection of China’s “cold war mindset.”
However, he warned against Washington entering negotiations with the junta or giving in to Beijing’s paranoia because, for now, “momentum is on the resistance’s side.”
Instead, “the incoming Trump administration should provide expanded US funding and non-lethal support … for the resistance to offset the weight of Beijing’s pressure.”
A recent article by Steve Ross and Yun Sun, both fellows at the Stimson Center, a Washington-based foreign policy think tank, warned against US ambivalence towards China’s role in Myanmar’s civil war.
“The US can no longer afford to view Myanmar as a ’boutique’ issue. The coup has unleashed tremendous chaos within Myanmar as well as regional instability and poses a threat to US national interests in strategic competition with China, including the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights,” it says.
The European Union, which imposed a new round of sanctions on junta officials and their aligned businesses last month, has fewer strategic interests in Myanmar and will be more averse than the US in seeing China’s embrace of the junta in geopolitical terms, analysts say.
However, a European diplomatic source told DW on condition of anonymity that the EU’s strategic interest in Southeast Asia lies with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and having a member state of the bloc “very much dependent on Beijing weakens ASEAN, making it less autonomous.”
What is the role of ASEAN?
ASEAN has been widely criticized for its flimsy handling of the Myanmar crisis, a result of its ten member states being perennially divided between tougher measures against the junta or accepting its coup as the new normal and partnering with it.
Malaysia, which takes over as the regional bloc’s chair next year, has been a loud voice in demanding a tougher response, but analysts say that now the junta has overt backing from Beijing, it’ll make ASEAN’s already defective response even more challenging.
The concern now is not just that the crisis is drawn into the US-China power rivalry, but ASEAN grows even more divided between the member states content to allow China more influence over regional affairs and those who see this as being the death knell for the bloc.
Rebel advances concerning for China
Ethnic militias have captured vast swathes of territory this year, culminating in a significant blow for the junta in August with the fall of its Northeastern Regional Command.
“This shocked China,” said Jason Tower, the Myanmar program director at The United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
He told DW Beijing began to fear that ethnic militias might actually be able to topple the junta and form an alliance with the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s shadow government.
The NUG has proposed a federalized structure for Myanmar, which it says will address the country’s long-standing ethnic conflicts. However, analysts suggest Beijing views this plan with skepticism, fearing it could create a power vacuum and exacerbate instability along its border.
Moreover, it believes the NUG and its allied People’s Defense Forces, a collection of anti-junta militia, usually composed of civilians, are too aligned with the United States and the West.
China has also backed the junta’s proposal to hold elections next year, which Beijing views as a potential off-ramp for the conflict. In October, Min Aung Hlaing, the junta leader, traveled to China for talks—his first visit since the coup.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn
